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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The police detained Natalie Miramontes while they conducted a residence check on
another female probationer. During the detention, an officer searched a purse he knew belonged
to Ms. Miramontes, without her consent, and found baggies, syringes, and a crystalline substance
that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine inside the purse.

Ms. Miramontes

moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of her detention and the search of her purse.
The district court denied her motion, and Ms. Miramontes entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving her right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion.

On appeal,

Ms. Miramontes contends the district court erred by denying her motion where her purse was
searched absent reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, and the
probationer's Fourth Amendment waiver did not make lawful the search of Ms. Miramontes's
purse. The evidence found in the purses and the during the subsequent search of the room in
which Ms. Miramontes had stayed at the home should have been suppressed as the fruits of an
unlawful search, and this Court should reverse the district court's order.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 10, 2018, Parole Officers Raynee Myler and Matt LaVallee arrived at Christine
Evans's home to do a residence check. (11/27/18 Tr., p.9, L.7 - p.10, L.17.) Ms. Evans was on
felony probation, and she was being supervised by Officer Myler. (11/27/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-13.)
Ms. Evans was on the phone when Officer Myler knocked and, before she opened the door for
Officer Myler, she walked to the back of the house and then came back to the front door.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.10-19.)

When she opened the door for the officers, Officer Myler

immediately walked to the back of the house, where she saw through an open window a different

1

female, later identified as Natalie Miramontes, hunched over and moving away from the back of
the house. (11/27/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-19; p.8, L.17 - p.9, L.24.) Ms. Miramontes was in the yard
near a shed, approximately ten feet from the house. (11/27/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.10-21; p.48, L.11 p.49, L.22; State's Exhibit 2.) Officer Myler yelled for Ms. Miramontes to "stop" three times.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.22.)

Officer Myler saw Ms. Miramontes was carrying a

backpack, which she dropped before coming back into the house. (11/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.23-24;
p.45, Ls.1-10.)
Officer Myler questioned Ms. Miramontes, and learned her identity. (11/27/18 Tr., p.12,
L.3 - p.13, L.4.) Ms. Miramontes said she had stayed at the house with Ms. Evans for one night.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-6.) Officer Myler asked Ms. Miramontes for her identification, which
Ms. Miramontes said was in her purse.

(11/27/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-16; p.13, Ls.23-25.)

Ms. Miramontes tried to go get the purse, but Officer Myler did not allow her to do so, and
instead asked Officer LaVallee to retrieve the purse for Ms. Miramontes. (11/27/18 Tr., p.13,
L.25 - p.14, L.8; p.36, L.21 - p.37, L.2.) Ms. Miramontes described her purse as a floral,
patterned bag.

1

(11/27/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.3-5.) When Officer LaVallee opened one of the three

cosmetic bags he had located amongst the things Ms. Miramontes dropped in the yard, a bag
printed with palm trees, he saw what appeared to be illegal drugs and paraphernalia. (11/27 /18
Tr., p.15, L.12 - p.16, L.4; p.42, Ls.2-8.) Ms. Miramontes's identification was not in the print
bag with the palm trees.

(11/27/18 Tr., p.46, Ls.19-24.)

The probation officers stopped

searching and called the police department. (11/27/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-17.) While waiting for the
other officers to arrive, Officer Myler handcuffed Ms. Miramontes, but told her that she was not

1

Ms. Miramontes apparently was referring to one of the three cosmetics bags as her "purse," and
her identification was located inside a wallet in the large floral print cosmetics bag. (11/27 /18
Tr., p.16, Ls.2-17; State's Exhs. 3-6.)
2

under arrest. (11/27/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.4-12.) During Ms. Miramontes's detention, all three of the
cosmetics bags that had been in Ms. Miramontes' s possession in the yard were searched.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.41, L.4 - p.46, L.4; State's Exhibit 2.) Officers found methamphetamine and
drug paraphernalia in the bags. (11/27/18 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-24; State's Exhs. 3- 6.)
Ms. Miramontes identified the room in the home where she had slept, and a search of that
room yielded a syringe and a container that held suspected methamphetamine.

(11/27/18

Tr., p.18, L.3 - p.19, L.25; p.70, L.11 - p.71, L.3; R., p.14.).) Based on the items found in the
purses and the room, the State charged Ms. Miramontes by Information with felony possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp.41-42.)
Ms. Miramontes moved to suppress the drug-related evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. (R., pp.63-65; 73-80.) Specifically, she
asserted that both her seizure and the subsequent search of her purses and the room in which she
slept violated the Fourth Amendment. 2

(R., pp.63-65; 75-79.)

The State filed a response

asserting the seizure of Ms. Miramontes was justified by reasonable suspicion, and the search of
the purse was likewise justified by reasonable suspicion, since Ms. Miramontes was carrying the
purse when she left the house. (R., pp.97-98.) The State claimed that the initial detention of
Ms. Miramontes was permissible because the probation officers were present at Ms. Evans's
residence, who was on probation at the time and had agreed to submit to searches of her
residence and belongings, and one term of Ms. Evans's probation was not to have unapproved

2

After the district court's determination that Ms. Miramontes' detention was lawful, the Idaho
Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Phipps, 166 Idaho 1, 454 P.3d 1084, 1085 (2019),
cert. denied, No. 19-1309, 2020 WL 5882265 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020). In Phipps, the Court held
parole officers may detain a non-parolee while performing a routine search of a parolee's
residence. As such, Ms. Miramontes does not challenge her warrantless, suspicionless detention
while the residence check at Ms. Evans' s home was conducted. She challenges only the
warrantless search of her purses and the room in which she slept.
3

individuals residing at the residence.

(R., p.97.)

The State argued, alternatively, that the

doctrines of attenuation, independent source and/or inevitable discovery rendered the search
results not excludable as fruits of the poisonous tree. (R., pp.128-31.)
On November 27, 2018, the district court held a hearing on the motion. (See generally
11/27/18 Tr., p.4, L.7 - p.97, L.13.) Thereafter, district court entered a written order denying
Ms. Miramontes's motion to suppress. (R., pp.133-44.) The court found that the detention and
subsequent seizure of Ms. Miramontes was not in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
(R., p.136.) The court held that, during the efforts to verify Ms. Miramontes's identity, Officer
LaVallee opened the purse and did not permit Ms. Miramontes to retrieve her own identification
card for officer safety reasons. (R., p.142.) The court's decision discussed the search using the
State v. Williams, 162 Idaho 56, 63 (Ct. App. 2016), factors, fmding that it was a de minimus
invasion of Ms. Miramontes' s privacy interests, which did not overcome the more weighty law
enforcement interests. (R., pp.142-43.) The district court balanced Ms. Miramontes's privacy
interests with the interests of the government and concluded that the detention of
Ms. Miramontes to confirm her identity was de minimus and constitutionally permissible.
(R., p.142.) "Additionally, the detention of the Defendant via handcuffs upon the discovery of
drug related items was also de minimus and constitutionally permissible." (R., p.143.) The court
concluded that the intrusion to Ms. Miramontes' s liberty did not overcome the more weighty law
enforcement interests regarding the need to control the scene for officer safety, as well as prevent
the detained individual from concealing or disposing of any evidence. (R., pp.142-43.)
Ms. Miramontes entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended information charging
her with possession of a controlled substance. (11/22/19 Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.22, L.24; p.25, Ls.24; R., pp.158-67.) The State agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (11/22/19 Tr., p.21,

4

Ls.5-25; R., pp.168-69.) As part of the plea agreement, Ms. Miramontes reserved her right to
appeal the district court's order denying her motion to suppress. (11/22/19 Tr., p.29, Ls.12-22;
R., p.162.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Miramontes to three years, with two years fixed,
suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Ms. Miramontes on probation for three years. 3
(11/25/19 Tr., p.42, L.23 - p.43, L.4; R., pp.182-85.) Ms. Miramontes timely appealed from the
district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.186-88, 192-96.)

3

Ms. Miramontes' sentence in this case was ordered to be served concurrently with her sentence
in Bannock County case number CR-2017-3019, a case in which Ms. Miramontes pled guilty to
grand theft. (11/25/19 Tr., p.36, Ls.4-18.)
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Miramontes' s motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Miramontes's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Ms. Miramontes asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress

because her purse was searched, absent reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing.

Further, neither officer safety nor the probationer's Fourth Amendment waiver

authorized the search of Ms. Miramontes's purses or the room in which she slept. Finally, the
State's asserted exceptions to the exclusionary rule are inapplicable to this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571 (Ct.
App. 2014). "The Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial
evidence." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). "At a suppression hearing, the power to
assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court." Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. This Court exercises free
review of "the trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Danney,
153 Idaho at 408.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Miramontes's Motion To Suppress
Because Law Enforcement Lacked Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Of Criminal
Conduct
In this case, Officer Myler seized Ms. Miramontes because she was on the premises

during a probationer's residence check.

However, although Ms. Miramontes was observed
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leaving the probationer's residence out the back door, such did not give rise to reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. At most, Officer Myler had an unsubstantiated hunch.
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is always "the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).

Reasonableness hinges on "on a balance between the public

interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
"must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require
the seizure of the particular individual, or that seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (emphasis added). The Brown Court went on to note "we have required
the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity." Id. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
facts considered with objective and reasonable inferences that form a basis for particularized
suspicion. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983-84 (Ct. App. 2003). Particularized suspicion
consists of two elements: (1) the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances,
and (2) the determination must yield a particularized suspicion that the particular individual
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
"An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those
inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training." State v.
Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). However, the officer "must be able to articulate

more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion' or 'hunch' of criminal activity."

8

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-124 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 ( 1989)). As the Idaho Supreme Court concluded in State v. Gonzales:
The fatal flaws in the State's case are that Officer Scholten never articulated what
criminal suspicion he had of Gonzales' behavior, other than the fact that Gonzales
was perhaps hiding from him. As we have iterated above, an officer must "have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690.
Here, the officer failed to articulate what suspicion of criminal behavior he had
that led him to direct the flashlight onto himself and detain Gonzales.

State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 674 (2019) (emphasis in original).
Flight is not, standing alone, a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion, "the United
States Supreme Court had declined to adopt per se rules regarding flight, but retained the totality
of circumstances analysis when considering whether reasonable suspicion existed." Padilla v.

State, 158 Idaho 184, 189 (Ct. App. 2014).

The Padilla Court was referring to Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the
defendant's "presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking" combined with "his unprovoked
flight upon noticing the police" provided reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances such that an investigatory stop was warranted.

Id. at 124-25. The Wardlow

majority explained that "[h]eadlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of
evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." Id.
at 124.
The State contended that Ms. Miramontes's flight provided Officer Myler with
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Ms. Miramontes to investigate her for purposes of
identification, safety, and to investigate her potential involvement in criminal activity. (R., p.86.)
On appeal, Ms. Miramontes does not challenge the officers' authority to enter and look over
Ms. Evans's residence based upon Ms. Evans's Fourth Amendment waiver. (See State's Exhibit
1.) Recent Idaho case law has also affirmed the constitutionality of Ms. Miramontes's detention
9

due to her presence at the home of such a probationer during a routine probation search of the
See State v. Phipps, 454 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2019).

home.

However, Ms. Evans's Fourth

Amendment waiver did not provide authority for the officers to search Ms. Miramontes or her
personal property. Although the district court did not address the lawfulness of the search of
Ms. Miramontes' s purse,4 Ms. Miramontes argues on appeal that her purse was unlawfully
searched without her consent and absent a warrant or reasonable suspicion (much less the
probable cause necessary to have obtained a warrant).
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). "A search and
seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable."
Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796.

"When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the

defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement is applicable." Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002); State v. Hunter, 156
Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014) (same).
One exception allows law enforcement to detain individuals while executing a search
warrant. "When law enforcement officers are executing a search warrant on a premises, officers
are allowed to briefly detain the occupants of the premises described in the warrant." State v.
Davis, 158 Idaho 857, 860 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705

(1981)).
4

The Summers rule "extends farther" than others "because it does not require law

There were three patterned cosmetics bags recovered from the armful of items Ms. Miramontes
dropped in the yard. (11/27/18 Tr., p.41, L.4 - p.42, L.15; State's Exhibit 4.) Ms. Miramontes
described her "purse" as the floral print bag. (11/27/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.3-5; p.43, Ls.1-3 p.75, L.5 p.76, L.4.) Officer LaVallee opened a purse printed with palm leaves, not flowers, and observed
drug items. (11/27/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.12-19; p.42, Ls.2-24; p.76, Ls.2-18; p.78, Ls.1-3.)
Regardless of which purse Ms. Miramontes meant, all three purses or bags were in her
possession and she did not deny ownership or responsibility for any of them. Herein,
Ms. Miramontes shall refer to her "purse" as the cosmetic bag with palm leaves printed on it.

enforcement to have particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or
poses a specific danger to the officers." Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193 (2013). In
State v. Phipps, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a suspicionless

detention of a third party during a routine parole search. 454 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2019). The Court
held, ''when an individual is being lawfully detained during such a search, their rights under the
Fourth Amendment are not infringed by an officer's questioning, even if unrelated to the
detention or the search . . . officers have the categorical authority to detain all occupants of a
residence incident to a lawful parole or probation search and to question them as long as the
detention is not prolonged by the questioning." Id. at 1091.
A felony probationer's consent to searches as a condition of probation provides
justification for warrantless searches of the probationer's home. State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745,
747 (Ct. App. 2011). However, when the basis for a search is consent, the State must conform
its search to the limitation placed upon the consent. Id. 150 Idaho at 749. "The standard for
measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective
reasonableness." Id. (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
In this case, Officer Myler spoke to Ms. Miramontes and asked her name and to see her
identification.

(11/27/18 Tr., p.12, L.3 - p.13, L.4; p.12, Ls.15-16; p.13, Ls.23-25.)

Ms. Miramontes identified herself as Natalie Miramontes. (11/27 /18 Tr., p.12, L.3 - p.13, L.4.)
However, when Ms. Miramontes tried to go to her purse to obtain her identification, Officer
Myler stepped in front of her, preventing Ms. Miramontes from performing the task, "She
attempted to retrieve her ID when I asked her for it, and I did step in front of her way. And I -- at
that time I told her that Mr. LaVallee would go and get that for her. And she stepped back."
(11/27/18 Tr., p.36, L.24 - p.37, L.2.) Neither officer asked Ms. Miramontes for permission to

11

open her purse. (11/27/18 Tr., p.36, L.17 - p.37, L.11.) Officer LaVallee found a printed purse
and opened it outside of Ms. Miramontes's presence. (11/27/18 Tr.,p.75, L.11 - p.76, L.9.)
Upon opening the purse, he saw drug-related items. (11/27/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.12-19; p.42, Ls.2-8.)
The State has not claimed that Ms. Miramontes consented to the search of her purse.
R., pp.86-98.)

(See

Nor is the State's purported "safety concern" justification for the search of

Ms. Miramontes's purse. 5

And, contrary to the State's argument, the identification of

Ms. Miramontes in order to determine Ms. Evans's compliance on probation does not give rise to
an exception to

the warrant requirement

such that the

officer

lawfully searched

Ms. Miramontes's purse to retrieve her driver's license. (R., pp.97-98.) Although the district
court seemed to discuss the lawfulness of the search using the Williams factors, concluding there
was a de minimus invasion of Ms. Miramontes's privacy interests which did not overcome the
more weighty law enforcement interests (R., pp.142-43), Williams was a case in which the Court
of Appeals analyzed the lawfulness of the defendant's detention during the execution of a search
warrant. Id. 162 Idaho at 63-64. A search of the defendant's personal possessions was not at
issue in Williams. Id. Finally, the State has not claimed and the district court did not find that
Ms. Evans had actual or apparent authority over Ms. Miramontes' s purse or the items in the
room Ms. Miramontes had been sleeping in. (R., pp.73-144.)
It is clear that Ms. Miramontes displayed ownership of the purse and an intent to maintain

control over the purse by attempting to obtain her identification without assistance from law
enforcement. (11/27/18 Tr., p.36, L.24 - p.37, L.2.) She was prevented from doing so, and the
5

Officer safety is not an exception to the search warrant requirement, but may warrant a Terry
frisk, or pat-down search of the suspect's clothing. See State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662
(2007) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) in holding a pat-down may be justified
following an objective determination as to ''whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.")

12

purse was opened by law enforcement absent a warrant, absent consent, and absent reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.

D.

The State's Proposed Exceptions To The Exclusionary Rule Do Not Apply
Ms. Miramontes asserts that suppression is required, because the State's claimed

exceptions to the exclusionary rule are inapplicable where they do not sufficiently purge the
evidence of its primary taint. "Generally, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search
may not be used against the victim of the search." State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004).
"The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both 'primary evidence obtained as a direct
result of an illegal search or seizure' and, pertinent here, 'evidence later discovered and found to
be derivative of an illegality,' the proverbial 'fruit of the poisonous tree."' State v. Cohagan, 162
Idaho 717, 720 (2017) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)).

"To

determine whether to suppress evidence as 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' the court must inquire
whether the evidence has been recovered as a result of the exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Page, 140
Idaho at 846 (citation omitted); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)
(quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, 221 (1959) ("[T]he more apt question ... is "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."). The question then becomes whether the
State can prove that the evidence in question was recovered as a result of the exploitation of that
illegality or whether it would have been obtained even if the police illegality is removed from the
equation. See State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 909 (2019) (holding State failed to meet its burden
to show the evidence would have inevitably been discovered).
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Here, the district court did not reach the question of whether an exception to the
exclusionary rule-the inevitable discovery, independent source, or attenuation doctrinesapplied because it found no Fourth Amendment violation. (R., pp.136-43.) However, this Court
should reach that question because the search of Ms. Miramontes's purse clearly violated her
Fourth Amendment rights.
The officers were aware that there were three bedrooms in the house, with one being used
by Ms. Miramontes. (11/27/18 Tr., p.33, Ls.5-19.) Thus, after the purse was opened and drugrelated items identified, Ms. Miramontes's other purses were searched, as was the room where
Ms. Miramontes slept, with the understanding that the officers were searching Ms. Miramontes' s
belongings-there was no evidence or argument that either officer believed the items they were
searching were owned by Ms. Evans or were in common area. See State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho
961, 969 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding district court did not err by concluding that Daigneau lacked
actual authority to consent to a search of Robinson's private bedroom and bathroom even though
other residents could access the bathroom). Nor was there evidence or argument that the officers
reasonably believed at the time of the search that Ms. Evans was in control of the purses or the
area in which Ms. Miramontes had been sleeping. See Robinson, 152 Idaho at 966 ("[T]he
analysis related to a determination of whether a third party had apparent authority to consent to a
search of premises is limited to what officers knew prior to a search of such premises.").
The State asserted that the discovery of controlled substances in the purses and later in
the room in which Ms. Miramontes slept was sufficiently attenuated from the officer's search for
identification. 6 (R., pp.118, 124-25.) The State asserted that the search of Ms. Miramontes's

6

The State did not initially assert attenuation or any other exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
instead the district court asked the parties to address the issue in post-hearing briefing. (2/25/19
Tr., p.16, L.24-p.17, L.11.)
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purses and the room Ms. Miramontes had been occupying would have been searched by the
officers as part of the residence check. (R., p.127.) However, the record is contrary to the
State's claims.
Officer Myler testified that she was there to perform a routine residence check on
Ms. Evans.

(11/27 /18 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-13.)

Typically these residence checks involve "visual

contact, a small overlook of the house. We make sure that there's no alcohol in the fridge, that
the place is in order. That's basically it." (11/27/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-14.) Upon seeing the drugrelated items in the purse, Officer Myler called the police department. (11/27/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.110.)

Officer Myler testified that she did not think there was a problem with Ms. Evans's

probation-the residence check was standard policy.

(11/27/18 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-20.) Officer

Myler did not testify that she intended to search the residence before seeing the drug-related
items in Ms. Miramontes's purse. (See 11/27/18 Tr., p.5, L.8 - p.54, L.4.)
Ms. Miramontes contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving the
"attenuation" exception to the exclusionary rule where the discovery of the contraband in the
purses and the discovery of the drug-related items in Ms. Miramontes's room "flowed directly
from the illegal search, with no intervening factors to consider." State v. Downing, 163 Idaho
26, 31 (2017). The officers did not discover the contraband in the room Ms. Miramontes had
been sleeping in by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the taint of the unlawful
search of her purses.

The unlawful search provided the sole basis for Ms. Miramontes's

continued detention and the subsequent search of the room in which she had slept, revealing
additional drug-related items, thus, there was no intervening circumstance to attenuate the
unlawful behavior from the discovery of evidence.

See State v. Fairchild, 164 Idaho 336

(Ct. App. 2018) (holding dispatch's confirmation of valid arrest warrant did not arise until after
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the first baggie of methamphetamine was discovered, thus, the causal chain between the officer's
unlawful frisk and the discovery of the first baggie of methamphetamine remained intact).
Likewise, the State failed to meet its burden of proving the "inevitable discovery"
exception to the exclusionary rule. The State argued that, because Ms. Evans had waived her
Fourth Amendment rights and her residence was subject to search at any time, "it would be
inevitable that controlled substances ... would be discovered in the residence." (R., p.130.)
However, the State points to no evidence supporting its assertion that the officers intended to
search the residence during their routine residence verification check. (11/27/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.614.) If the officers had not unlawfully searched Ms. Miramontes's purse, the other drug-related
items would not have inevitably been discovered-there would have been no basis to look into
the other purses or to rifle through the room she had slept in had the officers not searched her
purse.

See Downing, 163 Idaho at 32 (holding the doctrine of inevitable discovery "must

presuppose inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing
directly from the officers' unlawful conduct").
Finally, the State failed to meet its burden of proving the "independent source" exception
to the exclusionary rule.

The State claimed "it can be determined by a preponderance of

evidence that the evidence of Defendant Miramontes' s possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine would have been inevitably discovered during a lawful search of the residence
and that the search would be an independent source." (R., p.131.) However, there was no
independent source of the drug-related items found in either the purses or the bedroom where a
lawful search of Ms. Miramontes's possessions at Ms. Evans's home did not take place. See id.,
163 Idaho at 31 ("The independent source doctrine is where a lawful approach actually taken
leads to the discovery of evidence that was also derived from unlawful means.").
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Miramontes respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying her motion to suppress, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of December, 2020.
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